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ABSTRACT 
 
In this study, we examine the effects of corporate governance practices on financial performance of Pakistani listed 
firms. On the bases of agency theory, MM theorem, and theory of firm, we suggest that corporate governance effects 
firm performance directly as well as indirectly via mediation of capital structure and dividend policy. The model 
was tested using a cross-lagged analysis of 100 non-financial firms with the structural equation modeling (SEM). 
The study concludes that corporate governance improves financial performance by exploiting capital structure and 
dividend policy. The findings of this study, highlights the importance of corporate governance practices for peer 
firms to restructure their debt and dividend policies for the enhancement of their financial performance.  
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INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
orporate Governance practices is “The set of laws, policies, institutions and process affecting the 
approach; a company is administered, controlled and directed” (Cadbury, 1992). The term “corporate 
governance” came into popular use in the 1980's. Corporate governance ensures some key objectives 
including transparency in both financial and non-financial transactions and accountability of related parties (OECD 
1999, revised 2004). (Konzelmann, Wilkinson, Fovargue-Davis and Sankey (2010) explained that corporate 
governance is dynamic for sustainability of firm and in absence financial instability and depression occurs. Primarily 
governance concerned with the duties and responsibilities of a company’s board of directors to successfully lead the 
company and the relationship not only with shareholders but also with stakeholder. Corporate governance includes 
laws, policies to govern “private” and “public” firms. It also establishes business performance measures which 
collectively govern the relationships among marketplace economy, corporate directors and entrepreneurs, who 
invest capital in firms. 
 
The purpose of good corporate governance practices makes positive effects on capital structure of firm. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) examined this mechanisms, capital structure decision maker of the firm confirm that they possibly 
will attain a considerable returns and benefits on their investments. By means of reliable governance structure, it is 
significantly easier for goodwill of corporations towards not only their shareholder but also their stakeholders. Good 
corporate governance crate also goodwill of the firm in the market which eventually build the trust of the investors 
towards their investment of this firm. Governance control not only maintains their good relations to their internal 
stakeholder but also create good value to their external stockholder. Although governance or top management of the 
firm maintain a lot of responsibility which mainly includes firms financial performance, firms debt issues either sort 
term or long term, announcement of dividends etc. Jensen (1993) and Hart and Moore (1995) documented that 
company managers borrowed debt from the market, financial institutions and other sources but they did not 
managed it in the favor of companies earrings which against the shareholder interest that’s why many companies 
windup their business even much they were bank corrupt. The lack of accountability and transparency of issuing and 
re-packaging debt security (see Enron case) in capital structure generates higher cost and lower cash flow only. 
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The good corporate governance crate a balance between their capital structure decision and the development of the 
firm which protect the rights of all stakeholders of firm (Abdullah, Ahmad & Roslan, 2012). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) explain that ownership structure which helps to reduce the agency conflicts, for this reasons it is supporting 
the interest of shareholders and ownership of the firm. Along with the high significance of conflicts between 
shareholders and internal managers, the corporate governance mechanisms of the firm are generally considered as an 
ineffective measure.  Fama and Jenson (1983) also argued that the role of chairman and CEO are supposed to be 
considered as separate from each other, the chairman has the chief decision control authority and CEO has the chief 
decision executive authority, and the CEO of firm has the responsibility to control all operations of the organization. 
However, duality is able to increase control as well as taking decision towards improving the entire process of the 
firms. Wen, Rwegasira & Bilderbeek (2002) examined the effects of Chinese listed firm’s broad structure on the 
capital structure polices. This study suggests that higher board’s corporate governance having impact on lower 
capital structure, on the other hand size of board member and capital structure revealed insignificant associations. 
Florackis and Ozkan (2009) also suggest that UK firms have strong evidence about their significance level and 
explained that the structure of corporate governance also depends, as well defines Sarbanes Oxley Act’s causal 
relationships. Conclusion of the study said that Oxley act has been developed to enhance firm’s transparency and 
governance; it is substitute of capital structure in resolving agency conflict.  
 
Saad (2010) investigated the effect of Malaysian firm’s corporate governance compliance on financial leverage. 
Study concludes the relationship among corporate governance internal mechanisms and capital structure. Magdalena 
(2012) documented through the panel data of listed firms at Indonesian Stock Exchange, stated that board of 
director’s size inversely effects capital structure procedure while not including bank and financial institutions. 
Gugler (2003) analyzed the panel data set of Austrian firms and explained the relationship between internal 
corporate governance mechanisms and dividend payments, gave estimation that corporate governance mechanism 
determines dividend pay-out ratios. Hu and Kumar (2004) concluded that internal governance mechanisms have 
significant and relatively positive effects on dividend payments level. Hwang, Park & Park (2004) examined in the 
study of Korean business group that good corporate governance pay higher dividends.   
 
Kowalewski, Stetsyuk, &Talavera (2008) research findings upkeep the argument of dividends payments. The study 
was particularly focused on Poland market where the firms are bound to pay higher dividends to shareholder 
because rights are highly protected for shareholders. Adjaoud and Amar (2010) documented that in their study 
conduct on the data set of Canadian market in which they conclude that effective governance has significant and 
positivity impact on dividend income for shareholders of the firm. Jiraporn, Kim and Kim (2011) and Abdullah et al. 
(2012) documented that dividend policy is directly related to the quality of governance which improves overall 
financial position of the firms except unexpected economic change and also suggest that ownership structure plays 
an important role to resolve the agency problem. Thanatawee (2013) conducted a study depends on the sample of 
1927 observations for a time period of eight years for Thailand listed firms and inferred that ownership structure 
heavily influences the dividend policy, particularly organizations have to pay higher dividend with the higher 
percentage of institutional shareholding. 
 
The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance widely discussed in prior literature mainly in 
developed states and over the last decade It also been discussed in developing and emerging economics based on 
accounting and market measures of the firm. Mehran (1995) and Klein (1998) documented that firm performance 
and board committee structure that higher proportion of outside directors on the board has insignificant relationship 
with firm performance. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) examined the relationship among governance indicators 
with long-term equity returns, value of firm and the performance of the firm based on accounting measures. The 
results revealed that the firms which follow good corporate governance practices shows higher returns on equity, 
higher value of firm and enhanced accounting results than that firms which have poor corporate governance 
practices towards controlling and managing the firms activities. 
 
Drobetz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann (2004) illustrated that there is positive relationship between corporate 
governance practices and expected stock returns employed German publicly listed companies. Javed, Iqbal and 
Hasan (2006) concluded that corporate governance practices not entirely helpful towards enhancing financial 
performance of Pakistani listed companies. Some other factors still continue to improve financial performance either 
these are internal or external factors. Haat, Rahman and Mahenthiran (2008) conducted a comparative study of 73 
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good and 73 bad performance listed firms of Malaysian stock exchange based on corporate governance, 
transparency and performance employed hierarchical regression technique and realized that corporate governance 
dynamics contain strong predicting influences on the firm performance in Malaysia, in general due to debt 
monitoring and foreign ownership structure.   
 
Kajola (2008) studied four major corporate governance mechanisms; such as board composition, board size, CEO 
statue and audit committee. The research findings advocate that the relationship between board composition and two 
key performance measures return on equity and net profit margin are not statistically proved as significant. On the 
basis of sampled firms, the implications of the study revealed that no relationship exists between firm performance 
and corporate governance, when outside directors are the part of overall board size. Ehikioya (2009) and Renders, 
Gaeremynck and Sercu (2010) examined the positively significant relation between ownership construction and firm 
performance on the data set of Nigeran Stock Exchange and also found positive relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm’s performance in a Cross-European study covering fourteen countries. It is further 
added that the strong points of this relationship appears after some conditions which basically depends upon the 
excellence and value of institutional environment. Lima and Sanvicente (2013) documented that the main concerns 
of corporate governance is to determine how a company minimize its costs that increases due to the agency’s 
conflicts and what strategies managers be able to make towards improving the firm’s performance. The relationship 
between capital structure and firm performance on several industries, which noticeable on elevated measure within 
variation of characteristics beginning wherever development, expenditure and demand (Wippern, 1966). Hurdle 
(1974) examined that capital structure influence negatively on profitability in concurrence among the two stage least 
squares (2SLS) and positively according towards ordinary least squares (OLS). Lev (1974) argues that organizations 
with high leverage have a tendency to illustrate more inconsistency of their accumulation income than 
comparatively less levered organizations. An enhancement in the leverage increases the risk of the firm’s 
accumulated income.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) examined that the preference of capital structure might facilitate moderate organization 
costs. They argued that high utilization of debt resources can decrease organization expenditure during the risk of 
bankruptcy, which causes own losses to managers’ salaries, standing, and throughout difficulty to produce cash flow 
to compensate interests everyday expenditure. Brigham and Gapenski (1996) studded an optimal capital structure is 
able to survive in that condition if there is a tax sheltering profit make available to enhance in debt intensity is 
equivalent to the bankruptcy costs. They both also recommend that managers of a firm must be capable to recognize 
that when the optimal capital structure is achieved they must be struggling to continue it on that point. On that level, 
the financing expenditures and cost of capital are decreased, in this way firm value and performance are growing. 
On the other hand, Chhibber and Majumdar (1997) documented that intensity of debt to equity ratio (capital 
structure) relates inversely among firms financial performance. Abor (2005) reported in their study the combination 
of capital mainly categorized into short term and long term debt and total debt of the firm. Conclusion suggests that 
firms those rely on debt particularly, it will not attain tax protections and after that it leads to enhanced debt 
expenditure of which the firm describes as the economic failure risks and decrease the return. (Bunkanwanicha, 
Gupta and Rokhim (2008) examined the relationship among debt, decision-making activities and financial 
performance of the firm in Thai and Indonesian markets. Their results draw attention towards the significance of the 
country-particular institutional surroundings in managerial ownership-associated organization harms. 
 
Kale and Noe (1990) suggested that “dividend acts as a signal of the stability of the firm’s future cash flow”. 
Brigham et al. (1996) suggested that dividends provide perhaps the best and most reliable signal and that “an 
increase in dividend signals management’s confidence level would be strong towards the future earnings will be 
strong enough to support new and higher dividend and vice versa” Brigham et al. (1996). Nissim and Ziv (2001) 
documented that the dividend policy is much important for business in many ways likewise; to retain their 
shareholder, predicting future earnings etc., but it depends on the top level management “how much they share their 
percentage of annual earnings to shareholders” through pay dividends. Amidu (2007) examined the relationship 
among return on assets, return on equity, sale growth and dividend payments in their research and conclude that 
dividend payments significantly affect the performance of firm over the next years and also found positive and 
significant relation among studded variable with dividend payout. The results also revealed a statistically significant 
relationship between profitability and dividend payout ratio. Kouki and Guizani (2009) conduct a study on Tunisian 
companies and they conclude that dividend payout is highly associated and affected by ownership concentration. 
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Aggrawal and Kyaw (2010) conduct a study on dividend payout and capital structure issues and conclude that 
leverage and dividend policy both are alternative apparatus to control the ‘agency’s cost’ and improves the firm 
financial performance.  Study also suggests that pay dividend to shareholders may also improve the level of activity 
of the organization which eventually increases the income level and have more retained earnings to achieve the set 
standards.  
 
Ali and Ullah (2011) conduct a research on dividend policy and ownership structure on the data set of Pakistani 
listed firm from 2002-2006 and conclude that cash dividend level is higher where the owners’ presence in the board 
of directors is higher. Results point out that managerial ownership appears to have a visible and significant effect on 
dividend payout. Ajanthan (2012) conduct a study on Sri Lanka hotel industry to measure the relation between one 
of the governance variable ‘board independence’ with dividend payout policy and conclude that there is a positive 
significant relationship between them. Another study conducted by Abor and Fiador (2013) also concludes a 
positive significant relation between board independence and dividend payout ratio employed the data set of 
Egyptian companies. Shehu (2015) documented that in their research conduct on Malaysian listed firms for small 
data set 2013 and conclude that a significant positive impact on dividend payout ratio. This study examines the 
relationship among corporate governance, capital structure, dividend policy and firm performance directly and 
indirectly in Pakistani listed firm on Karachi Stock Exchange considers as emerging economy. Furthermore, this 
study partially fill the gap by examining the mediating role of capital structure and dividend policy while corporate 
governance effecting the firm’s performance. It elaborates the direct and indirect effects of corporate governance 
towards financial decisions and firm’s performance which eventually considered as output at the end of financial 
year.   
 
Hypotheses  
 
Following hypotheses to be tested for this study:  
 
H1: Corporate governance measures have positive effects on capital structure of firm.  
 
H2: Corporate governance measures have positive effects on dividend policy of firm.  
 
H3: Corporate governance measures have positive effects on firm performance.  
 
H4: Capital structure of firm has positive effects on firm performance.  
 
H5: Dividend policy of firm has positive effects on firm performance. 
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HYPOTHESIZED RESEARCH MODEL 
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothesized Research Model 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
Overall Population and Sample Size 
 
The archival financial and non-financial data of the firms gathered from Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) which is the 
prime stock exchange of Pakistan. On behalf of this research study financial institutions such as Banks, DFIs, 
Leasing Companies, Insurance Companies, Modaraba Companies, Exchange Companies, and Mutual Funds were 
not included in the sample size due to entirely different assets allocation from other industrial firms. In this way all 
financial companies were excluded and the population reached to only non-financial listed firms out of which 
stratified random sample to be illustrated for analysis. Seven key sectors having hundred peer firms are included in 
this study, which enhances the value of study and its analysis. Given below the sector wise distribution of companies 
for sample size: 
 
 
Table 1. Sector Wise Classification (2006-2011) 
No. Sectors Number of Firms Years 2006-2011 
1 Cement 15 90 
2 Coke and Refined Petroleum Products 9 54 
3 Sugar 15 90 
4 Textile 21 126 
5 Fuel & Energy 13 78 
6 Information, Communication & transport Services 11 66 
7 Motor vehicles, trailers and auto parts 16 96 
Total  100 600 
Source: (Balance Sheet Analysis) 
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Data Collection 
 
The given research study is quantitative and based on the secondary and panel data which is generally collected 
from publicly listed companies. Only those firms are included in sample which remain listed and performed 
operations during the study period and the data was available for all of the years. The annual reports for the period 
of 2006-2011 were gathered through companies included in sample size.  The data is extracted from the financial 
statements of these firms using Balance Sheet Analysis (BSA) published by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP).  
 
Data Analysis 
 
For this study, data sets are analyzed through SPSS, and SEM-PLS. To test the hypothesis of the relationships; 
Structural equation modeling based on cross-lagged analysis used to assess the models. Cross-lagged path analysis is 
basically designed for panel data which were collected for same individual more than one times. As well cross-
lagged path analysis is widely used to conclude causal relationship in the data from longitudinal research design.  
 
Structural Equation Models Development 
 
Based on the theoretical discussion this study is expected a significant and positive relation among the studded 
variables, corporate governance, capital structure, dividend policy and firm performance in the above stated 
hypotheses. This study tests the above mentioned hypotheses on the basis of measurement, structural and regression 
models. 
 
Measurement Models 
 
In the hypothesized structural model all indicators shown in squares build and influence their respective latent 
constructs shown in circles. These latent constructs can be measured in mathematical terms such as:  
 𝜁 = 𝑋$𝛽$ + 𝑋'𝛽' + 𝑋(𝛽( + 𝑋)𝛽) + 𝑋*𝛽* + 𝜀 ξ$ = 𝑦$𝛽' + 𝜀 ξ' = 𝑦'𝛽' + 𝜀 𝛿 = 𝑦(𝛽( + 𝑦)𝛽) + 𝜀 
 
Structural Models 
 
The first hypothesis influence of latent exogenous variables, corporate governance measures (ζ) on latent 
endogenous variables, capital structure (ξ1) would be measured through: 
 
Hypothesis 1:   CG → CS    ξ1 = ζ1β1+ɛ 
 
The second hypothesis influence of latent exogenous variables, corporate governance measures (ζ) on latent 
endogenous variables, dividend policy (ξ2) would be measured through: 
 
Hypothesis 2:   CG → DP    ξ2 = ζ1β1+ɛ 
 
The third hypothesis influence of latent exogenous variables, corporate governance measures (ζ) on latent 
endogenous variables, firm performance (δ) would be measured through: 
 
Hypothesis 3:   CG → FP   δ = ζ1β1+ɛ 
In this way the forth hypothesis influence of capital structure (ξ1) on firm performance (δ) would be measured 
through: 
 
Hypothesis 4:   CS → FP    δ = ξ1 1β1+ɛ 
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In this way the fifth and last hypothesis influence of dividend policy (ξ2) on firm performance (δ) would be 
measured through: 
 
Hypothesis 5:   DP → FP    δ = ξ2 1β1+ɛ 
 
While the effects of corporate governance, capital structure and dividend policy on firm performance would be 
calculated through:  
 
FP = α+ (CG) 1β1+ (CS) 2β2+ (DP) 3β3+ɛ   δ = ζ1β1+ξ1 2β2+ ξ2 3β3+ɛ 
 
 
Table 2. Description of Exogenous and Endogenous Variables 
Variables Symbols Acronyms Measurements 
Corporate Governance Ζ CG Independent 
Board Size χ1 BS 
Total number of directors on the board including chairman and chief 
executive officer. 
Board Composition χ2 BC 
The proportion of internal and external directors excluding chairman and 
chief executive officer to the total number of directors on the board. 
CEO Duality χ3 CEO 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if CEO also holds the Board Chairman 
position and 0 otherwise. 
Audit Committee Size χ4 ACS Total number of directors on the audit committee. 
Annual General Meetings χ5 AGM Total number of meetings held in a year 
Capital Structure ξ1 CS Mediator 
Debt to Equity Ratio y1 D/E Total Liabilities / Shareholder’s Equity 
Dividend Policy ξ2 DP Mediator 
Dividend Ratio y2 DR (Net Profit before Tax – Tax Provision) / Total Amount of Dividend 
Firm Performance δ FP Dependent 
Return on Assets y3 ROA Net Income before Tax / Average of Total Assets 
Return on Equity y4 ROE Net Income before Tax / Average of Shareholder’s Equity 
 
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
 Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
BS 7.00 14.00 9.7000 1.74214 .558 .100 -.836 .199 
BC 5.00 12.00 8.1317 1.882244 .482 .100 -1.059 .199 
CEO .00 1.00 .4333 .49595 .271 .100 -1.934 .199 
ACS 2.00 6.00 3.5583 .81304 .896 .100 -.582 .199 
AGM 2.00 59.00 11.1917 9.72896 2.300 .100 5.791 .199 
D/E -292.32 795.70 4.7422 49.66205 13.085 .100 206.356 .199 
FR -500.01 79.87 1.5695 21.38435 -21.462 .100 507.802 .199 
ROE 823.35 442.49 9.4311 66.97624 -4.339 .100 51.497 .199 
Valid N 600        
Source: SPSS output 
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Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
 BS BC CEO ACS AGM D/E DR ROA ROE 
BS 1         
BC .964** 1        
CEO .160** .398** 1       
ACS .384** .333** -.092* 1      
AGM -.066 .053 .240** .030 1     
D/E -.026 -.027 -.019 .030 -.003 1    
DR -.035 -.042 -.036 .026 -.058 -.039 1   
ROA .022 -.014 -.136 .125** -.053 -.062 .206** 1  
ROE .027 .042 .064 .052 .007 -.175** .186** .405** 1 
Source: SPSS output  
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed) 
 
 
Table 3 explains the detail summary of descriptive statistics of all variables included in this study which consists of 
independent, mediating and dependent variables. Table 4 represents the correlation matrix of each variable. The 
result shows that ROE and D/E are negatively correlated at -.175 respectively, while ROE as a dependent variable 
have positive relationship with all other explanatory variables. The correlation of ROA of all non-financial sectors 
with BS, ACS and D/E shows positive correlation at .022, .125 and .206, ROA with all other independent variables 
have negative correlation. DR of selected non-financial companies shows negative correlation with explanatory 
variables, other than ACS which shows positivity at point .026. On the other hand the Pearson correlations of all 
corporate governance indicators with each other are positive except BS with AGM and ACS with CEO at -.006 and 
-.092, the variance-covariance among variables is too high for BS and BC which is on the higher side .964. This 
indicates that both these variables represent the same financially viable phenomenon.   
 
KMO Measures Of Sample Adequacy (MSA) 
 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measures test is the analysis part of our study it is vital for factor analysis method. Bhaduri 
(2002) also explains the importance of factor analysis technique as the statistical tool. The technique depends on 
twofold. Extracting the factors based on KMO MSA rule and regress the extracted factors against dependent 
variables. KMO Measures of sample adequacy (MSA) value 0.379 demonstrates that data. Both of these indicators 
apparently show satisfactory outcome for performing factor analysis. 
 
 
Table 5. KMO and Bartlett’s Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .379 
Barlett’s Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 3.120E3 
Df 36 
Sig. .000 
Source: SPSS output 
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Table 6. Varimx Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 3 
Board Size .951 -.027 .097 
Board Composition .930 -.034 .292 
CEO Duality .187 -.033 .811 
Audit committee Size .621 .089 -.304 
Annual General Meetings -.055 -.010 .626 
Debt to Equity Ratio .033 -.377 -.237 
Dividend Ratio -.030 .520 -.111 
Return an Assets 0.78 .738 -.226 
Return on Equity .040 .793 .138 
% of Variance in Rotation 24.462 17.744 15.276 
Eigenvalues: 2.285 1.632 1.256 
Source: SPSS output 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 
According to above table factor 1 is highly loaded with board size, board composition and audit committee. Board 
size and composition have no more diversity and balances the power of the board and enlarges the controlling power 
of chairman or CEO and ensures no more transparency of transactions in firms. Therefore this study considers board 
size as a factor. Factor 2 is highly loaded with return on equity, return on assets and dividend ratio. Return on equity 
and return on assets are positively related and having important value for the firm. Again return on equity and return 
on assets determines the independent functioning capability of the firm. The higher board paves the way for more 
independent thinking and decision for to improve the performance on the basis of returns after considering financing 
decisions. Therefore this study considers both return on equity and return on assets as the factor. Factor 3 is highly 
loaded with CEO duality and annual general meetings. They both are considered important for higher director’s 
shareholding position and may attract fewer institutions to hold or purchase new shares of the company. Therefore 
this study considers the CEO duality and annual general meetings as a factor. Factor one account for 24.462 of the 
variance, second 17.744 third 15.276, a total is 57.482 of overall variance.  
 
Partial Least Square Analysis  
 
Partial Least Squares (PLS) technique based models analyzes and interprets into two ways. First, Measurement 
model evaluation and then structural model evaluation. The relationship between observed variables and latent 
variables (factors) evaluated by measurement model. Structural model specifies relations between latent constructs. 
Estimating and analyzing the path coefficients between the constructs test through structural model. Path 
coefficients are indicators of the model’s predictive ability. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF MEASUREMENT AND STRUCTURAL MODELS 
 
Analysis of the measurement model attempts to confirm the reliability and validity of all latent variables that are 
included in the structural model. To estimate reliability and validity of the measurement model correctly reference 
must be made either the indicator is formative or reflective. In case of reflective indicators item reliability, construct 
reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity should be checked.  
 
While in case of formative indicators, loadings are misleading because correlation between indicators within a 
construct is neither required nor taken into account while estimating the construct parameter, thus no need to check 
item reliability. It makes no sense to compare loadings among indicators within a construct, accordingly making the 
internal consistency unnecessary. Rossiter (2002) and Diamantopoulos and Siguaw (2006) are of the view that no 
dimensionality and reliability test are performed on formative indicators because of factorial unity and internal 
consistencies are not relevant thus composite reliability measure Cronbach’s Alpha is not desirable. While, Andreev, 
Heart, Maoz and Pliskin (2009) conclude that construct reliability of formative indicators should be performed 
through test of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Multicollinearity and indicator validity through their statistical 
significance. Interpretation of a construct with formative indicators should be based on the weight of each indicator 
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(Chin, 1998). Like canonical correlation (multivariate statistical model) these weights allow understanding the 
contribution of each indicator in emerging the construct. However potential threat of multicollinearity should be 
removed before running the structural model (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001). 
 
In partial least square method, first item that PLS provides to determine how well the model fits the hypothesized 
relationship is the squared multiple correlations (R2) for each dependent construct. To measure the relationship and 
their effects among CG, CS and DP on FP, it seems beneficial to employ cross lagged modeling based on SEM-PLS 
to examine the impact of explanatory variable to dependent variable. The cross lagged analysis based on structural 
equation modeling gives an estimation of the effects of CG on CS, DP and FP. It would be written as follow:  
 
δ = ζ1β1+ξ1 2β2+ ξ2 3β3+ɛ 
 
From the right side (β1) specifies the beta and path coefficients of the latent endogenous variable (ζ1) used for 
Corporate Governance. The other are (β2, β3) specifies beta and path coefficients of second and third latent 
endogenous variables (ξ12) for Capital Structure while (ξ23) for Dividend Policy. While at left side (δ) of the equation 
specifies the outcome variable for Firm Performance and (ɛ) is the error term. In PLS based SEM, strength of 
hypothesis formulated in this research study is generally measured through analyzing path coefficient (β). In order to 
have the statistical significance of path coefficients (β) a PLS algorithm and bootstrapping techniques through 
Smart-PLS on the 600 sample data with replacement were applied the summary of required results given in the 
tables below:  
 
 
Table 7. Model-1 Summary and Hypothesis Testing 
 Relationships Path Coefficients R2 T-Value Sig. Hypothesis 
H1 CG1 → CS1 0.375 0.979 2.207 0.028 Confirmed 
H1 CG1 → CS1 0.342 0.958 2.207 0.028 Confirmed 
H3 CG1 → FP2 0.259 0.656 1.404 0.053 Confirmed 
H3 CG3 → FP4 0.182 0.568 2.270 0.017 Confirmed 
H1 CG4 → CS4 0.357 0.947 2.350 0.019 Confirmed 
H3 CG4 → FP5 0.132 0.454 2.218 0.018 Confirmed 
H4 CS5 → FP6 0.276 0.742 1.677 0.051 Confirmed 
H4 CS5 → FP6 0.234 0.741 1.677 0.051 Confirmed 
Source: SmartPLS-3 output 
 
 
From factor one variables the above table shows list of path coefficients (β), R2 along with t-values and significance 
from Model-1a for the period of 2006 to 2011. Which shows that CG effects on CS, CG effects on FP and CS 
effects on FP with time lag of one year have higher r-squared values (97%, 65%, and 74%), on the basis of r-squared 
values and positive path coefficients accepting H1, H3 and H4 of the study. From factor two variables the above table 
shows list of path coefficients (β), R2 along with t-values and significance from Model-1b for the period of 2006 to 
2011. Which shows that CG effects on CS, CG effects on FP and CS effects on FP with time lag of one year have 
higher r-squared values (95%, 45% and 74%), on the basis of r-squared values and positive path coefficients 
accepting H1, H3 and H4 of the study. On the other hand CG effects on CS for the same year have high path 
coefficient with higher r2 and significance level, while CG effects on the next year of performance positively and 
shows positive results which indicates that if firm following good corporate governance practices it might give 
better results for the coming financial year that is demonstrated by performing PLS on the bases of one cross-lagged 
analysis.  
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Table 8. Model-2 Summary and Hypothesis Testing 
 Relationships Path Coefficients R2 T-Value Sig. Hypothesis 
H2 CG2 → DP2 0.370 0.749 1.861 0.050 Confirmed 
H3 CG1 → FP2 0.268 0.511 1.902 0.010 Confirmed 
H5 DP4 → FP5 0.062 0.457 1.824 0.070 Confirmed 
H3 CG3 → FP4 0.322 0.866 1.403 0.075 Confirmed 
H2 CG5 → DP5 0.427 0.970 1.943 0.041 Confirmed 
H5 DP5 → FP6 0.350 0.622 1.950 0.039 Confirmed 
H3 CG3 → FP4 0.372 0.836 1.403 0.075 Confirmed 
H2 CG2 → DP2 0.375 0.807 1.861 0.050 Confirmed 
H5 DP5 → FP6 0.358 0.627 1.950 0.039 Confirmed 
Source: SmartPLS-3 output 
 
 
From factor one variables the above table shows list of path coefficients (β), R2 along with t-values and significance 
from Model-2a for the period of 2006 to 2011. Which shows that CG effects on DP, CG effects on FP and DP 
effects on FP with time lag of one year have higher r-squared values (74%, 86% and 62%), on the basis of r-squared 
values and positive path coefficients accepting H2, H3 and H5 of the study. On the other hand CG effects on DP for 
the same year have high path coefficient with higher r2 and significance level, while CG effects on the next year of 
performance positively and shows positive results.  
 
From factor two variables the above table shows list of path coefficients (β), R2 along with t-values and significance 
from Model-2b for the period of 2006 to 2011. Which shows that CG effects on DP, CG effects on FP and DP 
effects on FP with time lag of one year have higher r-squared values (80%, 83% and 62%), on the basis of r-squared 
values and positive path coefficients accepting H1, H3 and H4 of the study. Results of the study based on cross-lagged 
analysis in line with prior studies which were examined the relationship of these variables separately. The 
contribution of this study is into two folded; First, corporate governance is considered as the way to improving firm 
performance (Hart, 1995; Fama and Jensen, 1983) and it is also considered as the way that provide suppliers of 
finance with some protection in regards to their investment policies (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Rahman 2006 and 
Randers et al., 2010). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Corporate governance has a growing importance for stability among financial and social goals all around the Globe; 
corporate governance code in Pakistan has also developed for listed companies to certify accountability of 
transactions and better transparency. Corporate collapses like; ‘Enron’, ‘WorldCom’, and ‘One-Tel’ have 
encouraged the requirement for strong governance practices both in developed and enveloping state. Pakistani firms 
are family controlled since the earlier period and ownership is very concentrated. The relationship of corporate 
governance variables has been generally researched but still there are no appropriate results for end conclusions. In 
this research a large number of corporate governance mechanisms are taken for evaluating the relationship among 
governance practices with capital structure, dividend policy and firms financial performance.   
 
This study investigate the effects of corporate governance practices on capital structure decisions, dividend payout 
policy and firm performance of hundred peer firms’ listed as non- financial companies in Pakistan for the period of 
2006 to 2011. The outcome suggests that corporate governance mechanisms have positive significant relationship 
with financial decisions and firm performance indicators. Our analysis is formed in different statistical techniques 
including structural equation modeling (SEM) to check structural link among all variables. Analyses were performed 
through one year time lag for examining the hypothesis. Our study relates to the corporate governance internal 
practices, financing decision, dividend payout and financial ratios.  
 
This study has summarized the internal corporate governance mechanisms and their relationship with capital 
structure, dividend policy and firm performance. It add value to the literature and open new dimensions for further 
studies, in which both internal and external corporate governance mechanisms and practices would include along 
with their effects on capital structure, dividend policy and firm performance proxies. Predominantly this study 
contains peer firms governance practices and their behavior while making financial decisions to enhance their 
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performance which may increases the value of firm. Peer firms play an essential role in determining a number of 
corporate policies, and existing evidence suggests that the behavior of peer firms may matter for financing structure.  
 
Corporate governance aims to control the management activities for the best interest of shareholder requiring the 
rights and responsibilities among different related parties in the organization.  According to the literature review and 
previous studies corporate governance literature has two stands. Firstly, it considers guiding and improving the firm 
performance (Hart, 1995; Fama & Jensen, 1983); and the second considers providing suppliers of finance with some 
protection in regards to their investment policies (Rahman, 2006; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The second thought has 
become the center of contemporary corporate governance studies since the collapse and scandals of the large 
corporation in developed economies. This research study falls into the both school of corporate governance 
literature, and it examined the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on financial policies such as capital 
structure and dividend policy, as well examines the effect of this whole phenomenon on firm performance. 
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ANNEXURE A 
 
Cross-lagged Structural Models 
 
 
Model 1A 
 
 
 
Model 1B 
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Model 1(A, B): Structural Relation among CG, CS and FP 
 
 
Model 2A 
 
 
 
Model 2B 
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ANNEXURE-B 
 
 
Graphs 
 
Graphical Representation of Model 1A 
 
 
 
 
Graphical Representation of Model 2A 
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Graphical Representation of Model 1B 
 
 
 
 
Graphical Representation of Model 2B 
 
 
 
